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Existing satel l i te  concepts of operation 
depend on readily available experts and are 
extremely manpcwer intensive. Areas of expertise 
required include mission planning, mission data 
interpretation, telemetry monitoring, and anomaly 
resolution. The concepts of operation have 
evolved to  their current s ta te  i n  part because 
space systems have tended to  be treated more as 
research and development assets rather than as 
operational assets. These methods of satel l i te  
c o m d  and control w i l l  be inadequate in the 
future because of the availability, survivability, 
and capability of human experts. Because space 
systems have extremely high reliability and 
limited access, they offer challenges not found i n  
other military systems. n7us, autonntion 
techniques used elsewhere are not necessarily 
applicable to space systems. RADC has developed a 
program to  make satel l i tes  much more autonomous 
using a variety of advanced software techniques. 
The purpose of t h i s  paper is to present the 
problem the program is addressing, some possible 
solutions, t h e  goals of t h e  RADC program, the 
rationale as to why the goals are reasonable, and 
the current program status. Also presented are 
some of the concepts used i n  the program and haw 
they differ from mre traditional approaches. 
1. Introduction 
@eration and control of satel l i tes  can be 
divided into two major areas: health/status and 
mission. Healtwstatus is a broad definition 
covering a l l  activit ies not directly concerned 
w i t h  executing the primary missim of the 
satel l i te .  This includes power control, thermal 
control, attitude control, telemetry 
collection/fomtting, station keeping, overall 
monitoring to insure nominal operation, md 
ancmaly resolution. Anomaly resolution consists 
of detecting and diagnosing a real or aparent 
anomly(ies1 , developing recomnded courses of 
action to resolve the anomly(ies) , executing one 
or more courses of action, and observing the 
results of that action(s) . These healtwstatus 
activit ies are somwhat generic between different 
satel l i tes  although the details will differ. 
The mission activit ies may involve situation 
assessment, scheduling, tracking, processing 
preplanned and real-time user requests, and 
mission data interpretation. These mission 
activities are not as generic as healtNstatus 
activit ies because they are more dependent on the 
type of satell i te.  For exanple, mission 
activities of a comnunications satel l i te  may be 
significantly different than a surveillance 
satel l i te  or a navigation satell i te.  
Both healtwstatus and mission are potential 
targets for greater autonomy. Each relies on 
ground support from experts with highly 
specialized knowledge. The basic goal of 
satel l i te  autonomy is to transfer t h i s  knowledge 
to the satel l i te  and enploy it so the satel l i te  
achieves rmch greater independence from the 
experts and the ground support infrastructure they 
require. The result w i l l  be a cormand and control 
system that is both affordable and survivable for 
future operations. 
2. Problem 
Current methods of comMnding and controlling 
both the healtwstatus and mission activities have 
limitations that must be addressed to insure 
effective satel l i te  operations i n  the future. The 
problem areas considered herein are cost, time 
delays, survivability , t he  increasing dependence 
on experts, and some unique aspects of t h i s  
problem compared to  other systems. 
2.1. Cost 
The comnand and control cost of satel l i te  
assets is measured i n  terms of the resources 
consumed, including manpower and facil i t ies.  
Current operations are costly and the cost w i l l  
likely become prohibitive i n  the future without 
significant changes i n  operational concepts. 
As the nwber of space systems grows, it w i l l  
become increasingly difficult ,  i f  not impossible, 
to find enough qualified personnel to  operate and 
control these systems. This is especially true i n  
the case of the technical experts who evaluate 
situations that are unusual, conplex, and 
difficult  to diagnose. These experts must also 
recomnend actions; such actions may be novel 
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solutions for unanticipated problems. A 
significant portion of the dollars expended i n  
operating and maintaining space systems is for 
personnel. Again, the key problem lies with those 
experts used to  deal with difficult  situations. 
Thus, even i f  enough people could be found t o  
perform the expert functions, the mey required 
may be prohibitive. This could have a major 
impact on an effort such as the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (=I) which may involve many more 
satell i tes than are currently s u p r t e d .  One way 
to  reduce to nunber of experts required for 
satel l i te  support is to  centralize comnand and 
control facil i t ies.  However, t h i s  can also create 
mre time delays and reduce survivability as 
described below. Also, centralized comnand and 
control doesn't ameliorate the need for numerous 
geographically-dispersed transmit/receive ground 
stations which experts need to  maintain frequent 
satel l i te  contact during difficult  situations. 
2.2. Time Delays 
One of the concerns with centralized comMnd 
and control is that it can cause delays by 
requiring individual users to  conmunicate directly 
or indirectly with the central control. This 
becomes necessary because the ground control ms t  
resolve conflicts i n  user requests and insure the 
system constraints are always satisfied. Even 
ignoring the delays entailed by requiring central 
coordination of user requests, t he  current methods 
of satel l i te  control are not particularly fast. 
This is especially true when unusual situations 
arise. That is, situations that are not covered 
by routine operating procedures require extensive 
expert analysis before resolution. Unique 
satel l i te  failures are one exanple of an unusual 
situation. Many satel l i te  failures take weeks  or, 
i n  some cases, even months to totally resolve. 
During t h i s  time, t he  satel l i te  may be safed and 
often cannot fully meet its mission goals. As new 
requirements come into play (such as S I ) ,  
response time w i l l  become more crit ical .  Not  only 
w i l l  it be necessary to take an irmgdiate response 
to reach a safe state,  but it w i l l  also be 
necessary to  quickly reach a final decision on a 
situation. Fortunately, efforts to  inprove 
response time can also increase efficiency. By 
speeding the decision process, resources o n h r d  
the satel l i te  can be used more effectively since 
more windows  of opportunity are available. The 
inprovement could be faster recovery from an 
anmlous condition or it may even be redirecting 
mission functions faster than ground controllers 
are able. 
2.3. Survivability 
Most of today's space systems uti l ize a 
centralized comnand and control concept for 
healtwstatus and mission functions. Although 
t h i s  can reduce ccxt, it can also create 
survivability problems. That is, a centralized 
comMnd and control facil i ty i n  a f i x e d  location 
is easier to target (destroy or electronically 
jam) than several mobile targets. Multi-node, 
mobile, distributed control systems for 
healtNstatus have been suggested to inprove 
survivability because such systems would be 
difficult  to target or jam. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to singly relocate a l l  personnel 
controlling today's satell i tes into mobile 
systems. Many people would singly be unwilling to 
work i n  a mobile (espeaially remote) facility. 
Also, the savings i n  personnel and facil i ty costs, 
gained through centralized control, would be lost. 
2.4. Increasing Expert Dependence 
Current space system are controlled by 
technical personnel assisted by experts (usually 
from the manufacturer of the satel l i te)  who 
evaluate c q l e x  situations and recomnend actions. 
These are highly technical people with long 
experience in satel l i te  design and operation. 
Interestingly, some efforts to  introduce more 
automation into satell i tes may actually conpund 
the need for these experts. This is because, 
although the automation reduces the efforts 
required by technicians, it can greatly increase 
the conplexity of the satel l i te  system i n  both the 
healwstatus and mission areas. This, i n  turn, 
can create a higher dependence on experts for 
difficult  situations or problems. 
Another problem is beginning to occur i n  
space system w i t h  long l i f e  spans, a 
characteristic which is generally desirable for an 
expensive, inaccessible asset. The problem is 
that a satel l i te  can "live" long enough for the  
original experts to  retire or move on to  other 
programs. Incoming people are not as familiar 
w i t h  the satel l i te ' s  design or history (i.e., 
heuristics of operation). "his creates a greater 
need to  capture t h i s  knowledge before the experts 
leave the program. Some NASA programs are 
recognizing t h i s  problem and attempt to create 
historical records of the experts knowledge. 
2.5. Different 'qpe of Problem 
Satellite anomaly resolution has significant 
differences from the anomaly resolution of most 
other systems such as aircraft. By design, 
satell i tes are highly reliable and have no 
physical access. whereas most anomaly resolution 
for an aircraft involves isolating a comn 
failure, most anomlies i n  a spacecraft are unique 
and unanticipated. Expert systems that u t i l i z e  a 
knawledge base b u i l t  up from experience and 
heuristics are inadequate for most satel l i te  
problems because the typical problem is new. 
2.5.1. High &liabil i ty 
Many studies have been perfonred to attenpt 
to anticipate problems before they occur, thereby 
decreasing the dependence on the s k i l l e d  experts. 
Unfortunately, i n  spite of these efforts to 
anticipate problems and provide procedures and 
equipnent to resolve them, as many as mof a l l  
major anomlies experienced by current satel l i te  
systems have been unanticipated and required 
experts for resolution (Figure 1). This is 
probably due to the great emphasis on system 
reliability. That is, i f  a failure rode is 
identified, the system is  designed to rake the 
failure extremly unlikely. Thus,. the failures 
that occur tend to have not been identified before 
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hand. 
2.5.2. Limited Aocese 
Even though today's satellites are very 
corrplex, the limited nmber of actions that can be 
taken for any one situation creates a bounded 
problem. Although penrutations cause t h i s  nunber 
to be large, it is mch smaller than the n d x r  of 
possible actions that could be taken with a system 
such as an aircraft because the aircraft is 
physically accessible. Thus, space systems allow 
the use of techniques that would be inawropriate 
in other dornains. 
3. potential Solutions 
All of the problems discussed can be 
alleviated if  satell i tes can be made mre 
autonomous and thereby reduce the dependence on 
available human experts. The need for mre  
autonomous satell i tes has been acknowledged by the 
Satellite Control Architecture Study sponsored 
jointly by Air Force space Connand and Air Force 
System CamMnd Space Division. Actually, 
satel l i te  autonomy is a function of system design, 
hardware reliability, redundancy, the environment, 
and a capability to analyze and act on changes in 
situations. 
Fortunately, new software techniques 
associated with Artificial Intelligence ( A I )  
research offer the unique hope of addressing the 
problem. The goal is to have a system that w i l l  
act as an expert would i n  the same situation. To 
be truly successful, such a system must not be 
limited to  predefined responses to predefined 
situations. It must, instead, be capable of 
reasoning about a new situation as a real expert 
would. 
3.1. Redundant Conponents 
Redundant components are an essential part of 
any satel l i te  autonomy concept. Without 
redundancy, few, if  any options exist for dealing 
with satell i te anomalies. The traditional 
approach for enploying redundancy is to provide 
automatic anomaly detection and automatic 
switching from the anomalous component to an 
equivalent backup. For some anomalies, automatic 
switching wi thou t  understanding the nature of the 
problem may be necessary because of the 
time-critical response required. One example 
might be switching to a backup voltage regulator 
because of a loss of power. Unfortunately, 
automatic switching is based upon assumptions 
which may not be valid a t  the time the anomaly 
occurs. As a result, switching to a backup 
component can further corrplicate the situation. 
Thus, it's important t o  minimize switching to 
backup components when t h e  anomaly is not fully 
understood. Because of limited ground support, 
the tendency for today's satell i tes is to employ 
automatic switching whenever possible, as long as 
further conplications are not expected. I n  
contrast to t h i s  method of using redundant 
conpnents, an on-board self-reasoning software 
system could aproach the problem a t  various 
levels to understand the cause of the problem mch 
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as a human expert would. 
3.2. &liable Conponents 
Today's satell i tes are generally composed of 
highly reliable components, and further advances 
i n  reliability w i l l  certainly enhance autonomy. 
If fact, if a component is considered reliable 
enough, t h e  redundant component my be l e f t  out of 
the design. Nevertheless, some components are too 
cri t ical  to avoid redundancy no matter how 
reliable they are. 
Another aspect of reliability is the impact 
on the expert supporting the satellite. A primary 
source of knowledge for the expert is the  
technical documentation for the satell i te.  
Hwever, it's also essential that the expert have 
operational experience i n  dealing with satel l i te  
anomalies i n  order t o  remain competent. The irony 
is that, while both a reliable satell i te and a 
competent expert are desirable, the expert's 
competency depends, i n  part, on satel l i te  
failures! 
3 . 3 .  Expert systems 
Many expert system are i n  use today whose 
problewsolving performance matches or exceeds 
that of a human expert w i t h i n  a limited domain. 
Ry incorporating heuristics, or "rules of thurrb," 
derived from a human expert(s), expert system are 
able to minuc the behaviour of the human expert. 
These heuristics are the aggregate of experiences 
from which the expert has learned (sometimes the 
hard way). Often the expert is unable to 
precisely delineate a heuristic, or, even worse, 
w i l l  falsely delineate a plausible heuristic. 
Even without these problems, heuristics 
axiomatically reference predefined problems. 
Thus, an expert system by itself cannot provide 
autonomy for a satel l i te  suffering unexpected 
problem. A t  best, an expert system can provide a 
reasonable init ial  attempt to  isolate a problem. 
The human expert, on the other hand, can f a l l  back 
upon more general knawledge when simple heuristics 
don't solve the problem. 
3.4. Neural Networks 
I n  the area of health/status, Neural Networks 
(Neural Nets) have been used to diagnose satel l i te  
a m d i e s .  The diagnosis can be almDst 
instantaneous i f  the Neural Net is ixplemented 
w i t h  parallel processing. Hawever, Neural Nets 
require many training exanples of predefined 
problems and, like Expert Systems, cannot diagnose 
a problem that was never defined. Also, t h e  cost 
of generating numerous real or precisely-similated 
anarrralies for the Neural Net to train on may be 
prohibitive. Even i f  t he  Neural Net correctly 
diagnoses the anomaly, it doesn't offer the 
potential for prescribing a solution. 
In  the mission area, Neural Nets my prove 
valuable i n  certain types of mission data 
interpretation (e.g., sa te l l i te  photos). Emever, 
they don't a p r  to have the potential for 
autonomously allocating mission sensor resources 
to meet dynamic requirements. 
3.5. Model-based Reasoning 
It w a s  stated above that AI promises 
significant promise to solving the described 
problems. Even though, the term "Artificial 
Intelligence" means different things to different 
people, several AI concepts apear  to be well 
s u i t e d  to the problem of satel l i te  autonomy. The 
f i r s t  of these is the idea of model based 
reasoning. Model based reasoning uses causal 
models of the system and its environment to reason 
about situations. The models are b u i l t  using the 
object-oriented programning techniques. This 
allows concise models to be b u i l t  for different 
physical aspects of t h e  system (e.g. electrical 
models, structural models, thermal models ,etc.) . 
Each of these models would include a deep basic 
understanding of t h e  specific satel l i te  design as 
well as basic physical principles. Although the 
final models would be specific for an individual 
satel l i te ,  their architecture and much of their 
basic knowledge is generic. Finally, they w i l l  be 
b u i l t  w i t h  tools making it easy to adapt them from 
one application to another. Model based reasoning 
uses special techniques to determine the cause of 
conflicts between model predictions and actual 
observed events. In addition, t h e  models are used 
to construct solutions to problems and to  try the 
solutions (through sirrulation) before actual 
comMnds are given to the satell i te.  Overall t h e  
model based concept provides (for the f i r s t  time) 
the capability to deal w i t h  unanticipated events. 
The system would be able to reason &out variances 
between the observed world and the world predicted 
by its models. The rrdels themselves could then 
be modif ied to mre closely mtch the observed 
world. They would also serve to  evaluate a 
goal-oriented searcli toward reso1vir.g any 
problems. The resoluticr? would not be 1I.mit.d t o  
only predefined actiens but  could also bc new,  
novel actions. It would also tjc n:uch ncre 
flexible. T h u s r  when S. pwer systen) was dyradedr 
the models would automatically adjust themselves 
to the new situation and would then serve to  
revise the constraints in power utilization 
procedures/schedulers. Viewed another way, the  
model based system tr ies  to capture how the system 
should work as opposed to  the traditional method 
of attenpting to capture a l l  possibilities of a l l  
problems. It's important to note that model-based 
reasoning is not limited to  naturally occurring 
events. Hostile events that degrade or impact the 
system performance can be handled the same way. 
The system need not know a l l  possible hostile 
actions, but  merely that the world is not as it 
should be. 
3.6. Natural Language 
Another AI technique that is awlicable t o  
autonomous satell i tes is natural language. In its 
plrest form, Natural language progrananing would 
allow a user to converse with a machine in the  
smne manner i n  which people c o m i c a t e .  k tua l ly  
the current state-of-art for natural language is 
not yet that advanced. Although current language 
parsers are extremely useful i n  some amlications, 
they are still  only valid for relatively small 
domains. Natural language research is, however 
useful for aFp1icatia-s other than natural 
language processing. This research has developed 
useful knowledge representation schemes, search 
techniques, and problem solutions. Some of its 
techniques for treating sequential events are of 
particular interest to satel l i te  operations. 
Scripts is a programning technique that w a s  
developed for natural language understanding. It 
w a s  found to be impossible to  understand language 
without understanding the context of the 
situation. Words, sentences, and whole thoughts 
require an understanding of the situation to 
eliminate anbiguities. Scripts can be written for 
comn situations to establish a loose 
relationship between events. These scripts can & 
referenced to  understand the dialog. A similar 
concept can be used to understand the telemetry 
data of a satell i te.  For example, a script could 
be written to  cover the events that usually occur 
when going into an eclipse or for some possible 
hostile events. These scripts then serve as 
possible references to resolve anbiguities i n  the 
telemetry data. A key feature of the  scripts is 
that they serve as a reference framework and not 
a s  a muatoty sequence of events. This gives 
them great flexibility. 
4.  RADC Satellite Autonomy (SA) Program 
4 .1 .  Background 
RADC has undertaken a major effort i n  the 
area of Artificial Intelligence, init ially 
concentrating on tactical and intelligence 
applications. During 1985-86 RADC worked w i t h  the 
Air Force Satellite Control Facility and Space 
Division to fund some studies and research into 
the application of A I  into satel l i te  systems. In 
additicn, Aerospace Coprat ion has done some 
research i n  the same area. Finally, F n y  
aerospace coRtractors have also been conductirg 
icdependent research md development i n  t h i s  same 
164 
field. A l l  of these studies concluded that 
a r t i f ic ia l  intelligence techniques conbined with 
advances i n  carplter speed, nremory density, and 
architecture promise significant progress toward 
solving satel l i te  autonomy problems. 
Studies by Space Division and Space Comnand 
also defined roadmap for future satel l i te  control 
system and thus help show how fo incorporate the 
technology advances. These studies advocate a 
phased amroach toward achieving autonomy 
beginning f i r s t  with system that interact w i t h  
humans. 
4.2. Description 
Fame Air Development Center (RAMJ) has worked 
with the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization 
(s)10), Air Force Satellite Test Center (MS'IC), 
Air Force Space Technology Center (AFS'IC), Space 
Division (SD), Air Force Astronautics Laboratory 
(MAL), and Air Force Space Conand to  create a 
program that uses AI techniques to achieve 
satel l i te  autonomy. The program is a multi-phased 
effort  that f i r s t  shows t h e  feasibility of the 
concept and then builds a prototype. This w i l l  be 
done using limited ground systems and then fu l l  
ground prototypes for an existing satell i te.  The 
long term goal of t h i s  program is an on-board 
autonomous design. This goal includes both 
health/status and mission functions. The output 
of the program w i l l  be a system design that can be 
given to  a System Program Office for incorporation 
into a new satel l i te  design. This program is not 
designed to  extend the A I  technology, but it w i l l  
make use of thf! most current technology methods 
and ideas. This is not .simply a program to 
develop better built-in-test or data 
compression/data analysis, but  is a program to  
develop a generic system capable of reasoning 
about i tself  or its environments. 
4.3. Goals 
4.3 .l. Handle Unanticipatd Situatians 
The abil i ty to handle the  unanticipated and 
the abil i ty to generate novel solutions are key 
i s s u e s .  This can best be explained by example. A 
typical function currently performed by people 
might be the scheduling of power utilization. 
Certainly, an algorithm could be made to perform 
t h i s  function, but  as time progresses the 
satel l i te  capabilities might change (systems fa i l ,  
etc.) or the operational requirements may change. 
Thus, the real key to autonomy i n  t h i s  case is the 
abil i ty to modify the scheduling procedure as 
events change. That is, a system should be able 
to develop and implement new scheduling 
constraints as the situation dictates. This is 
particularly true for situations where multiple 
users are tasking the same system. Therefore, a 
good scheduling system should be a flexible, 
reasoning type of system. 
4.3.2. Generic Solution 
The w\cc SA prcqrm w i l l  be developed and 
denonstrated init ially for three different types 
of satell i tes.  m r ,  the enphasis is to prove 
the viability of particular advanced software 
techniques that can be amlied to any satell i te.  
These techniques can then be incorporated into the 
in i t ia l  design of a satel l i te  so that, once 
deployed, elaborate ground support is not 
required. 
4.3.3. Cost Wuction 
Autonomous satellites that can, among other 
things, recover to a maxinnnn extent from 
ananalies, respond to contention for resources 
from users, and adjust n o m i ~ l  operations based on 
degrading conponents w i l l  provide a tremendous 
cost savings in terms of manpawer and facil i t ies.  
Note that the total n&rs of F p l e  and 
faci l i t ies  to  support satel l i tes  w i l l  likely 
increase i n  the foreseeable future, even with 
highly autonomous satellites. This is because the  
total nun33er of operational satellites w i l l  
dramatically increase. Hewever, b e  Cost 
reduction goal of the RADC SA program is to  reduce 
t h e  manpcwer/satellite and facil i t ies/satell i te 
ratios (Figure 2 ) .  This w i l l  d e  future 
operations bath possible and affordable. 
NUHBEA OF SATELLITES 
F i g u r e  2 .  
4.4. -roach 
Even though healtwstatus and mission 
operational concepts can be considered separately, 
some integration and dependency exists. For 
exanple, mission sensors have telemetry which must 
be analyzed i n  the same manner as support function 
telemetry. Thus, both healtwstatus and mission 
m u s t  be considered i f  greater autonomy is to be 
achieved. 
Cne can reasonably expect components 
comprising the health/status and mission areas to 
improve i n  both reliability and redundancy. 
Hcwever, the RADC SA program w i l l  plrsue greater 
autonomy through a synergistic awlication of 
expert system, model-based reasoning, and natural 
language concepts as previously discussed. 
4.5. Vnresolved Issues 
As described above, advanced software 
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techniques apear  to offer promise toward solving 
the difficult  problem of autonomy. However, there 
are some i s s u e s  that must be explored before these 
techniques can be dictated for use on future 
satell i tes.  Some of these i ssues  are described 
below. 
4.5.1. Scaling 
The f i r s t  of these issues is scaling. 
Although small self reasoning model-based systems 
have been built it is not yet proven that the 
results on these small systems can be scaled to 
larger system such as an entire satell i te.  
Fortunately, as stated above, the satel l i te  
problem is bounded. In addition, hierarchical 
structures and parallel processors my  be used i f  
scaling becomes a major problem. 
4.5.2. Satell i te Configuration 
Another issue concerns the configuration of 
the satell i te.  A model-based system rmst always 
track the current configuration of the satel l i te  
including the status of expendables. 
Unfortunately, the exact status of a l l  systems on 
the satel l i te  may not be known (especially i f  
anomalies have occurred) . - Thus, t he  model-based 
system may have to infer the status of systems. 
Since rmltiple inferences are often possible, the 
model-based system nust be able t o  track ml t ip le  
configurations simultaneously. As further 
information becomes available, the  models mst be 
revised and incorrect representations must be 
elimiMted. 
4.5.3. Data Archiving 
Data archiving is yet another issue. Proper 
interpretation of events requires the system to 
archive data for later use. This is especially 
necessary for detecting gradual changes in system 
performance. Archiving can become extremely 
expensive in memory and obviously not a l l  data can 
be archived. The problem l ies  i n  deciding how 
rmch to archive, haw to  compress it, and how to 
plrge it. 
4.5.4. Environment Modeling 
Modeling the external environment w i l l  be 
necessary for a robust model-based system design. 
Hcwever, the external environment is not nearly a 
straightforward model as the satel l i te  i tself .  
Ideally, the external environment would be 
represented i n  enough detail to resolve 
environmentally induced situations, b u t  not i n  so 
much detail as to unnecessarily complicate the 
system. Early studies have shown the advantage of 
supplementing a mcdel-based system wi th  an expert 
system ( to  heuristically handle anticipated 
situations) and t h i s  w i l l  probably be necessary 
for d e l s  of the environment. 
feasibility against real satell i tes.  I n  t h i s  
f i r s t  phase, a software system capable of doing 
a l l  healtwstatus for three mjor sa te l l i t e  
subsystems w i l l  be developed. In addition, a 
system w i l l  be developed to perform one major 
mission function i n  this  phase. These systems 
w i l l  be tested against existing robust satel l i te  
simulators and evaluated by current operational 
users. The exact designs for satel l i te  autonomy 
are currently being developed, but  several th ings  
have been shown: 
4.6.1. Goal Attainment 
Me perfect software that can totally mimic 
the human expert is not yet i n  sight. However, it 
does a p a r  possible to  achieve most aspects of 
each of the goals described above. In  addition, 
the software developed w i l l  exceed the human 
expert i n  many situations. This occurs because 
the systems are mre  thorough and can reason 
faster than people. Preliminary systems are 
addressing the key problem areas. They have found 
novel solutions to problems and have been able to  
reason about unforeseen situations. 
4.6.2. versus Cmventional Processing 
An autonomous system w i l l  ultifiately use both 
conventional and A I  techniques. The problem is 
large and corrplex, b u t  it still  appears to be 
generally solvable. 
5 .  SUmMry 
The problems with operation and control of 
satell i tes are real, here today, and getting 
wrse. Pdvanced techniques offer unique promise 
i n  t h i s  area. Although these techniques have 
limitations and concerns, they w i l l  go a long way 
toward solving these problems. The RADC Satellite 
Autonomy Program is a challenging program to use 
advanced techniques to develop a self reasoning 
system that can reduce the experts/system ratio 
currently necessary to operate and control 
satell i tes.  
4.6. Status 
Currently, the Satellite Autononiy progran is 
i n  its f i r s t  phase. The three prime contractors 
are being, Ford Aerospace, and TFW. These 
contractors are developing a system to prove t h e  
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